Stoic Emotion by Becker, Lawrence C.
Hollins University
Hollins Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship Philosophy
2004
Stoic Emotion
Lawrence C. Becker
Hollins University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/philfac
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Hollins Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Hollins Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lvilelle@hollins.edu,
millerjc@hollins.edu.
Recommended Citation
Becker, Lawrence C. "Stoic Emotion," in Jack Zupko and Steven K. Strange (eds.), Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp 250-275. Hollins Digital Commons. Web.
Stoicism 
Traditions and Transformations 
Edited by 
STEVEN K. STRANGE 
Emory University 
JACK ZUPKO 
Emory University 
DCAMBRIDGE 
~ UNIVERSITY PRESS 
12 
Stoic Emotion 
Lawrence C. Becker 
A successful rehabilitation of Stoic ethics will have to defeat the idea that 
here is something deeply wrong, and perhaps even psychologically im-
t 'ble about the kind of emotional life that Stoics recommend. The 
pOSSI , 
image of the austere, dispassionate, detached, tranquil, and virtually af-
fectless sage - an image destined to be self-refuting - has become a staple 
of anti-Stoic philosophy, literature, and popular culture. It has been con-
structed from incautious use of the ancient texts and is remarkably resis-
tant to correction. Reminders that the ancient Stoics insisted that there 
are good emotions are typically brushed aside by asserting that the an-
cient catalog of such emotions is peculiar; 1 that the emotions in even that 
peculiar catalog are not accorded much significance by Stoics; and that 
the ruthless emotional therapy practiced by Epictetus is a reliable guide 
to the sort of emotional life Stoics want all of us to cultivate - namely, a 
life of desiccated affect and discard able attachments. 
Both Stoics and anti-Stoics alike have developed an unwholesome fas-
cination with a picture ofthe Stoic sage drawn for extreme circumstances. 
We persist, in high art and low journalism, in telling and retelling stories 
of good people who resolutely endure horrors - injustice, torture, dis-
ease, disability, and suffering. Those of us who are attracted to Stoicism 
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Second Leroy E. Loemker Conference, 
"Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations," 31 March-2 April 2000, at Emory University. 
I am grateful to the participants at the conference for their helpful discussion. Special ac-
knowledgment goes to Tony Long, Brad Inwood, and Richard Sorabji. A much earlier ver-
sion of the paper was presented ata Stoicism conference at the University of London. in May 
1999. I am grateful to the justifiably more skeptical audience at that occasion, and particu-
larly to my commentator, Anthony Price, as well as to Richard Sorabji and Gisela Striker. 
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often find such stories inspiring, and even anti-Stoics give them grudging 
admiration. 2 But our fascination with them can be seriously misleading. 
It can cause us to treat the emotional remoteness and austerity exhibited 
by their heroes as central to the Stoic theory of good emotion, as opposed 
to something central merely to its traditional therapies for people in 
extremis. This is a mistake. 
Rather, as I argue here, Stoic ethical theory entails only that we make our 
emotions appropriate, by making sure that the beliefs implicit in them 
are true, and by making them good for, or at least consistent with, the 
development and exercise of virtue - that is, with the perfection of the 
activity of rational agency. At this very abstract level, a Stoic theory of 
emotion is similar to an Aristotelian one. But we should not be misled 
by this high-altitude similarity. Stoic theories of value and virtue are very 
different from their Aristotelian counterparts, so it will turn out that what 
counts as an appropriate Stoic emotion in a given case is often strikingly 
different from what counts as an appropriate Aristotelian one. But the 
central, high-altitude theoretical point is nonetheless important. Robust 
psychological heal th of the sort necessary for appropriate rational activity 
is a constitutive element of virtuoso rational agency - a constitutive ele-
ment of Stoic virtue. It thus follows that, insofar as emotion is a necessary 
element of this aspect of psychological health, it is necessary for virtue. 
It may be true that some ancient Stoics (notably Chrysippus) under-
estimated the extent to which emotion was a necessary component of 
psychological health and thus of virtue. But that is a matter of getting the 
facts straight, and surely all Stoics are committed to getting an adequate, 
accurate psychology as a basis for their normative account of good emo-
tion. The things that Chrysippus said about the heart being the scat of 
consciousness _ things ridiculed centuries later by Galen3 - are surely er-
rors that Chrysippus himself would have wanted corrected. Not ridiculed, 
but corrected. And if such errors informed his normative judgment~, 
surely he would not only have corrected his errors about physiology but 
also have made the necessary adjustments in his normative views. 
The obvious way to develop a contemporary version of Stoicism with re-
spect to the emotions is therefore to fasten on what the theory requires -
that is, on the conceptual relation between virtue and emotion in human 
beings - and on what the best contemporary psychology says about how 
such matters work out in practice. That is what I will do here, first by look-
ing at some relevant features of empirical psychology, then by considering 
the value of emotions in human life, and finally by examining the nature 
of sagelike tranquillity and Stoic love. 
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THE NATURE OF EMOTION 
Psychologists who study emotion have not yet developed a standard line of 
analysis of their subject, or even a standard nomenclature. I do not mean 
to suggest that the literature is chaotic; far from it. But it is difficult to 
summarize, because it is difficult to line up the accounts given by various 
writers. Much depends on the level of analysis - whether one is speaking 
of the neurophysiological substrate of emotion (Le., the activity of certain 
discrete anatomical structures in the brain stem and limbic brain),4 the 
more generalized physiology of emotional arousal (e.g., changes in blood 
chemistry and blood flow, pupillary dilation, galvanic skin response, mus-
cle tension),5 the interaction between these physiological states and cog-
nitive responses to them,6 or the phenomenology of emotional states 
as reported by human subjects during the treatment of their emotional 
disorders.7 In order to stay in contact with both Stoic theory and the full 
range of contemporary psychological accounts, it seems wisest here to 
situate the discussion first within what might be called commonsense 
phenomenology and then to pay special attention to both the cognitive 
content and the physiology of the states that we ordinarily describe and 
experience as emotional ones. 
Complexity: Affect, Sensation, Cognition, and Conation 
As we commonly use the term, emotions have analytically distinct com-
ponents, which mayor may not be distinct phenomenologically. Unless 
we are simply going to construct a technical definition, then (e.g., by 
insisting, implausibly, that various emotions are identical to various con-
stellations of beliefs, or gross somatic changes, or neurophysiological 
processes), we shall have to recognize the ways in which at least four 
elements configure emotional experience - elements we may call affect, 
sensation, cognition, and conation. To see this, consider the following 
bit of commonsense phenomenology. 
There is a difference between emotional and nonemotional belief. For 
example, I can hold the beliefs ordinarily implicated in a given emotion 
without "feeling" one way or the other about the state of affairs those 
beliefs represent - that is, without being in a state we would ordinar-
ily identifY as emotional. I can believe that I am in mortal danger, for 
instance, and that things are going to turn out very badly for me, with 
no countervailing good results for anyone, and still have a "flat affect" 
about it. (Affect is difficult to define, but it may be enough for present 
purposes to think of it as varying levels of attention, alertness, readiness, 
, 
j 
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energized arousal, pro, con, or mixed valuational attitudes, and perhaps 
a second-level awareness of that awareness.) This point about flat affect 
seems true no matter how specific and value-laden one makes the beliefs: 
in each case the believer mayor may not be in a significant affective state 
with respect to what the beliefs represent.8 So whether or not beliefs are 
necessary elements of all emotion, they are never sufficient for it. Affect 
is a necessary element also, and it may come close to being a sufficient 
element at the extremes of mood and passion. 
Further, some affective experience is coupled with an awareness of 
somatic phenomena - flushed face, racing heart, sweating, tightness in 
the throat, tears, tumescence, and so forth. We can get, and be aware 
of, such sensations without having the beliefs and affect requisite for a 
full-fledged emotion. Whiskey can produce a flushed face; slicing onions 
can produce tears. Moreover, we can have intense emotional experience 
without the awareness of such somatic changes. Think of a person who 
lacks sensation from the chin down, and thus literally cannot feel the hair 
on the back of his neck stand up when it does, or his nipples go erect 
when they do. So having the physical sensations characteristic of various 
emotions is neither necessary nor sufficient for having the emotions. That 
is why attempts to study emotion by studying facial expression, galvanic 
skin response, vegal tone, pupillary dilation, and so forth seem indirect 
at best. 
Finally, we may make a similar point about conation - understood 
as the orientation or urge to act that is often characteristic of emotion. 
The point is that conation does not always track emotion. One may be 
"paralyzed" by fear as well as set in motion by it. Diminished conation is as 
characteristic of some emotional states (ranging from blissful tranquillity 
to depression) as heightened conation is characteristic of some others. 
It thus seems best to treat full-fledged emotion in adult human beings 
as a complex phenomenon: affect, laden with beliefs, and sometimes 
laden with sensation or conation. In part because we want to assess Stoic 
claims about the way beliefs control emotion, it seems best to think of 
emotions as special sorts of affective states rather than special sorts of 
belief states.9 
Moods, Feelings, Emotions, and Passions 
Now suppose we distinguish four sorts of affective states, again consider-
ing them at first only in a commonsense, phenomenological way. Let us 
call them moods, feelings, emotions, and passions. Although they differ 
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along several dimensions, we can for convenience imagine them as ar-
ranged along a line that forms a nearly closed circle, beginning and end-
ing with more or less "pure" affect. At one end are "moods" or affective 
"tones" of various types (fleeting or prolonged, volatile or stable, discrete 
or diffuse, mild or intense), which begin at a point just discernibly dif-
ferent from no affect at all - a point at which, for example, a subject will 
report that consciousness is simply tinted or tinged with affect that does 
not seem to have a causal connection to either cognition or action, or 
to be related to any special physical sensation or somatic phenomena, or 
to be focused on anything in particular. Nonetheless, even the mildest, 
most fleeting moods can often be described in terms of quite complex 
subjective experience (anxious, secure, erotic, energized, serene, etc.), 
and neurological substrates for many of them can be identified and ma-
nipulated with drugs. Passions are at the other end of the line, ending 
in an extreme at which affect virtually obliterates cognition and agency-
an extreme in which, for example, people are so overwhelmed with what 
began as anxiety or rage or fear or lust that they are "out of their minds," 
or "don't know the time of day," and, if they can make reports at all, can 
report only a one-dimensional, feroci~usly focused affect. Passions can 
be much milder than this, of course, but we will use the term to apply to 
affect that is focused enough and strong enough to interrupt (as opposed 
to color, focus, direct, or otherwise shape) deliberation and choice. 
Between these extremes lie feelings and emotions. Feelings, we will 
"'-say, are distinct from moods. primarily by virtue of the subject's awareness 
of various sorts of physical sensations and somatic phenomena associ-
ated with the affect, as we!fas some causal implications for cognition and 
action - awareness that focus~s and thus intensifies the affective experi-
ence, making it seem localized and often giving it an object. (Full-fledged 
sexual arousal is a feeling in this sense, whereas low-level erotic affect is 
a mood.) And let us then say that emotions are distinct from other af-
fects primarily by virtue of the subject's awareness and appraisal of the 
cognitive components of an affect - the beliefs about the world that are 
implicated in the affect, awareness that complicates and further focuses, 
reinforces, or intensifies the feelings. Worry is an example; so is object-
specific, manageable fear. 
Contemporary Psychology and Stoic Theory 
There is a fairly impressive convergence between Stoic positions and con-
temporary psychology - even psychotherapylO - on the general nature 
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of moods, feelings, emotions, and passions. As far as I can tell, empir-
ical psychology has so far settled one dispute within ancient Stoicism, 
has strengthened a few philosophical criticisms of the ancient Stoic ac-
count, has raised new problems about the unity of rational agency, but 
has also confirmed much of the ancient Stoic doctrine on these matters. 
Contemporary Stoics will have to make some adjustments to the ancient 
doctrines, but nothing, I think, that will undermine their claim to being 
Stoics. 
The Persistence of Affective Impulse. The ancient dispute that modern psy-
chology seems to have settled is one between Chrysippus and posidonius, 
as reported by Galen." If it is true that Chrysippus believed Stoic moral 
training could effectively remove excessive emotions at their source, by 
removing the erroneous beliefs involved in them, and that this train-
ing could be so effective and so thorough that excessive emotion would 
never arise in the sage, then Chrysippus was wrong. Instead, posidonius 
had it right when he argued that primal affect was a permanent feature 
of human life that sages, like the rest of us, would always have to cope 
with. 
The modern evidence for this comes from two sources: neurophysiol-
ogy and pharmacology. Neurophysiologists have identified at least four 
anatomically distinct structures in the "ancient" or subcortical portion of 
the human brain that generate affective states - roughly fear, rage, panic, 
and goal-oriented desire. 12 These structures are directly responsive to 
both external stimuli and internal changes in brain chemistry prior to 
significant cognitive processing. There is, for example, a naturally occur-
ring hormone called cholecystokinin, which regulates secretions of. the 
pancreas and gallbladder. When this hormone is introduced directly Illt~ 
the bloodstream (a natural, but not normal occurrence in human phySI-
ology) it generates an anxiety response unconnected to any external ~r 
internal threat.13 Similar stimulants exist for other affective structures III 
the amygdala, and there are blocking agents as well _ pharmacological 
agents that cause those affective structures to quiet down temporarily, to 
cease generating affect. This does not mean that subsequent cognitive r~­
sponses are ineffective in controlling such affect. It only means that thIS 
sort of affective arousal and its immediate emotional or passional con-
sequences cannot be eliminated by cognitive (Stoic) training, any more 
than Stoic training can eliminate perspiration. Stoics with bad gallblad-
ders will just have to cope with anxiety, whether they are sages or n~t; 
similarly for people who have brain injuries, or brain tumors, that eXCIte 
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affective structures. Modern medicine is clear that cognitive training is 
not always the treatment of first choice for such affective disturbances. 
I assume that none of this causes fundamental or general problems for 
a Stoic account of the emotions, whatever it might mean for Chrysippus' 
particular theses. Mter all, other things being equal, if potable water is 
freely available to the thirsty sage, she will presumably drink it as a first 
remedy (reminding herself of its status as a preferred indifferent) rather 
than think away the thirst. So the fact that modern medicine sometimes 
recommends drugs or surgery as a first remedy should not, for that rea-
son alone, make it inconsistent with Stoic theory. Moreover, the affects 
generated solely by subcortical structures in our brains correspond to the 
sort of primal impulses or excitation so often discussed by Stoics as lead-
ing more or less involuntarily to proto-emotions (propatheiaz) , and thence 
transformed by further cognitive processes into full-fledged emotions. 14 
They thus fit comfortably into a contemporary Stoic account. The task 
for the Stoic is to recognize the source of affective agitation and proto-
emotion, and to correct any false beliefs that may have arisen from it 
along with the affect. Done effectively, in accord with a Stoic account of 
the good, that process will eventually transform the prop~theiai into eu-
patheiai. If anything is a fundamental or general aspect of a Stoic account 
of emotion, it is that. The reference to recognizing the etiology of the 
proto-emotion is a later amendment, but not one that is troublesome. 
More about that later. 
Happily, there is settled agreement, in the modern psychology of emo-
tion, that this fundamental aspect of the Stoic account is correct for a wide 
range of quite mild to quite strong affective states that are characteristic 
of psychological health. Leaving aside especially weak, strong, fleeting, 
or enduring emotional states for the moment, it looks as though there 
is no disagreement at all with even the ancient Stoic proposition that 
full-fledged emotions are distinguished from one another primarily by 
distinct (and constitutive) belief structures in the subject and are trans-
formable by changes in the subject'S beliefs. 15 The modern psychological 
amendment to this would simply be to insist that raw affect, generated 
in distinct neurological structures and having distinct behavioral con-
sequences, often precedes the cognitive content that turns it into full-
fledged emotion. 
The only thing that is troubling for Stoic theory in this amendment 
is the reference to behavioral consequences. That reference is emblem-
atic of the fact that modern empirical psychology is apparently much 
more comfortable with a modular conception of human agency than 
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Stoics would have expected it to be. In fact, it looks as though personality 
psychologists from Freud onward have generally worked with something 
more like a tripartite Platonic model of motivation and psychodynamics 
than a unified Stoic one. I think there is less to this than meets the eye, 
however. 
The Stoic hypothesis is simply that rational agency in mature human 
beings is unified in the sense that it is a conative power in which the di-
rect determinant of action is always the same one sort of thing - belief. 16 
The idea is that in mature, healthy human beings, pure affect, as long as 
it does not initially overwhelm agency, is immediately subjected to cog-
nitive appraisal and infused with cognitive content - beliefs that have 
consequences for the affect itself as well as for its translation to action. 
All affective states - or least all of those above the level of pure primal im-
pulse - have at least implicit, controlling beliefs, and are ultimately subject 
to the agent's ability to control those beliefs. Thus Stoic psychotherapy is 
a form of cognitive therapy - an effort to focus on, and then to correct, 
the cognitive errors that underwrite pathology. 17 
It is clear that, in order to be consistent with modem psychology, 
we would now have to modify these references to belief by replacing 
them with references to cognitive states generally. Such states include 
both active and dispositional beliefs, but also include perceptual fil-
ters, information-processing routines, and so forth, some of which may 
be quite "modular" at the level of neurophysiology. The question is 
whether, even with this modification, the Stoic hypothesis about the 
unity and power of rational agency are consistent with modem empirical 
psychology. 
It appears to me that the motivational part is consistent, almost by 
definition. If we distinguish between action and other sorts of behavior 
by using the former term to mark out the class of intentional or goal-
directed behaviors, then it clearly follows that whatever the original moti-
vating source of an action might be, that motivation will always be filtered 
through a cognitive state of some sort. And the evidence from psychology 
clearly supports the proposition that the content of the cognitive state de-
termines the nature (if not always the timing) of the consequent action. 18 
So that seems consistent with traditional Stoic doctrine. 
Nonetheless, it does seem clear that modem empirical psychology 
would reject not only the idea that we can extirpate subcortical affec-
tive impulses but also the idea that rectifying our beliefs will always, ulti-
mately, be effective in rectifying our affect. Modem Stoics will thus have 
to be more cautious than their ancient brethren in making claims for 
7~ __ ~_7 ___ .V~ •• ~ 
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the g If· I dge a wide va-. enera e fectIveness of Stoic training. We will acknow e alth 
nety of cases in which the human body can be overwhelmed by unh.e Y 
affect· t . . bes or VIroses. ,Jus as It can be overwhelmed by unhealthy mICro . 
Th· . . anythIfig 
IS IS not, it seems to me an admission that compromIses . 
fund I . . . ' me by dIsease amenta III StOICIsm. All sages are ultimately overco . . 
or iniu Th· b . . re matenalIsts, 
OJ ry. eIr odles are mortal. And because StOICS a . 
we hI· toO lIke ev-ave a ways acknowledged that our minds and emotions '.. 
erything else about us, are physical entities subject to disease and IfiJury. 
Ancient Stoics, confronted by the modern evidence, would surely have no 
difficulty adjusting their ideas about the root physical causes and ~ppro­
priate physical remedies for such affective neuropsychological dIseases 
and i~uries, even for sages. . 
The necessity for such adjustment is an example of the way in WhI~~ 
modern empirical psychology strengthens some of the traditional cntI-
. th most CISms of the Stoic psychology of emotion. There are several 0 ers, . 
of ~hich have to do with the relation between psychological health (~hIch 
StOICS recognize as a necessary condition for the development of VIrtue) 
and the amount and variety of affect in one's life (which Stoics have per-
haps traditionally underestimated). I deal with those matters in most of 
what follows. But I want to conclude this section by noting that contem-
porary Stoics will have to pay somewhat closer attention to moods and 
threshold affective states than the ancient texts do. Here is the problem. 
The Etiology of Mfect: Nonreferential or Liminal States 
On the standard Stoic account, one assesses the appropriateness of af-
fect by assessing the truth of the beliefs implicit in it - beliefs about the 
external events or states of affairs that elicit the affect, and beliefs about 
what attitudes we should take toward those external matters, given their 
value in Stoic terms. Appropriate emotion is necessarily emotion that is 
in accord with nature, that is, in accord with true beliefs about events and 
their value. The ancient Stoics were confident that cognition could drive 
affect and that rectifying our beliefs about the world could rectifY our 
emotions in this sense. 
Nonreferential Affect. Moods pose a problem for this traditional account 
for two reasons. One is that they often have peculiarly indeterminate 
cognitive content - content that is incorrigibly true (and thus not in need 
of correction) but that nonetheless can compromise rational agency in 
the following way. 
~----~~----------
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Think of ' d 
h anxIety, of the sort induced as a side effect by a rug or ormone B r c , 
f "e letS about the world that are implicit in such anxiety are o ten qUite g , 
h ,eneral, and quite probably true: "There are some thlllgs out t ere - thlUg th ' d'ffi I d s at I am missing right now _ that might be I· cu t an 
unpleasant £ d 
or me to cope with and I can't be sure what they are, an 
therefore h' I 
" Ow to cope with them," That is certainly true, as a genera 
dPropoSlt~on, And so, because this belief about the world is true, the stan-ard StOiC re ' ' C' I' 't' , sponse would be to focus on the evaluative bebets Imp IC\ III 
the anXIety b I' h h' - e lefs about whether it matters, ultimately, how suc t Illgs 
turn out and h " d ' Ow It IS appropriate for us to feel an act. 
, The problem is that such a response will misdirect our attention, We 
wIll be focus', I worry lUg on the mappropriateness of some very genera 
about the 0 ' t ny-" uter world, when the source of that general worry IS no a 
thmg m the Outer World but rather a wholly internal feature of our body 
chemistry 0 th: " I d' 'tl'on In , ,r e operation of an unconscIOUS emotIOn a ISPOSI ' 
senous cases " h I h' this way we may make senous mistakes about our ea till, 
~epeatedly qUieting the anxiety thrown up by a disease process by remin~­
mg ourselves again and again of what is of ultimate importance, In tlllS 
way we ultimately end in a misdirected Stoic version of praying without 
ce~sing, because the process becomes an ever tightening circle - waves 
of I~creasing anxiety followed by attempts at calm, followed by renewed 
anxiety from internal causes that become increasingly inaccessible to us 
as we focus ever more persistently on the value question, rather than on 
the physiology or psychodynamic that is repeatedly eliciting the anxiety, 
T,he obvious solution to this problem is to make sure that we pay at-
tention to the question of etiology, Is our affect being elicited by external 
e~ents or internal ones? Is the anxiety prompted by something in the e~­
V1ronment that we cannot quite identifY? Or is it prompted by changes III 
Our blood chemistry? In the case of emotions that have clear objects in the 
external world - fear of things that go bump in the night, for example -
the standard Stoic analysis may indirectly suffice, Mter all, if we assess our 
beliefs about night noises and find that they are false because we were 
having auditory hallucinations, then when the fear persists we will pre-
sumably be led to think about internal causes for it, In the case of affect 
that has no specific object, however, and prompts only general, incorrigi-
bly true beliefs about the world, we cannot rely on the assessment of their 
truth to lead us in the appropriate direction, So, especially in the case 
of what we might call "nonreferential" affect, we have to add something 
to the standard Stoic account, There are now three rather than two sorts 
of beliefs we must assess: beliefs about the etiology of the alTect; beliefs 
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about ta . ponse to those s tes of affairs; and beliefs about the appropnate res 
states of affairs 
I thO . : t but we should s IS a slgmficant change in Stoic theory? Probably no , 
acknowledge that it makes the theory somewhat less tidy. We can no 
1 1 1· ·t·n the affect onger p ausibly assert that the cognitive content imp tel 1 
itself is all we need to address in order start down the right pa~ towa~d 
asse··· . d h question of Its ssmg Its appropnateness. We will have to mclu e t e 
etiology as well. 
Threshold Affect. There is a related problem about affect that hovers at 
the threshold of our awareness of it. Such liminal states are problem-
atic for therapy because subjects have difficulty identifying the. nature 
of their affect (putting an illuminating name to it), or difficulty m even 
identifying its existence as affect. There is no serious divergence between 
Stoicism and modern psychology about one extreme of the emotional 
. ·t seso contmuum - namely the place where passions become so m en , 
overwhelming, that they literally stop thought. Both agree that, ~t that 
threshold, maintaining or restoring self-control requires a reductlOn of 
the affect, and both agree that such self-control is necessary for health 
and a good life. 
But consider affect at the other extreme of intensity - moods or feel-
ings, for example, that are difficult for subjects to perceive or name. ("You 
are very angry today." -Angry? I am? _ "Yes. Just think about what you've 
been doing.") Both Stoics and modern psychotherapists think that it is 
important for subjects to identity such states properly - to know them-
selves better. And just as we often need help in understanding that we are 
having difficulty seeing or hearing in threshold circumstances, we may 
need help identitying our affect. One obvious method for dealing with 
liminal auditory phenomena is to turn up the volume and keep it at a 
fully audible level. Doing something similar with our very mild affective 
states seems an obvious way of staying in cognitive contact with them. 
Even though deliberately dialing up the intensity of an affect sounds like 
a very un-Stoic thing to do,19 I suppose there can be no serious Stoic ob-
jection to it as long as the resulting emotional state does not disturb one's 
tranquillity. It is hard to imagine, however, that this would not be disturb-
ing, even for a sage, at the very least because it deliberately generates 
something that we then have to cope with. 
This is at least a small puzzle for Stoics. Some of what I have to say 
here about the value of emotion and about the nature of tranquillity 
may indirectly help address it, but I am not confident I have solved the 
~~-------------
Stoic Emotion 261 
puzzle. Stoi 
h . cs would suc hminal e . expect to solve it, of course, by noting that once 
clearly, its cog ~~tion is raised to the point where it can be identified 
th nltive co . h . 
e usual way Th ntent can be identified as well and dealt Wit III 
originallimi . I e result of that however especially if the source of the 
na emoti. ' , 
the deliberatel . on IS neurophysiological, may simply be to reduce 
thus Starting th~ heightened emotion back to its original liminal state, 
of sublimati cycle OVer again. Denial, or self-deception, or some form 
on - ev '" . I h . not consiste . en If It IS productive for psychological hea t - IS 
. nt With S . . h . 
Simply com l' tOIC Illsistence on self-knowledge, so t at option 
the etiol p ICates things further: Again we have reason to insist that Ogy ofth ., 
e affect be addressed. 
THE GOOD OF EMOTION 
I turn nOW to the . . 
Stoics re I question of the value of emotion in human life. Here 
so utelyd' . 
for think' IVerge from common opinion, having endurmg reasons 
~th~th h t of value e value is not very great _ or is, at any rate, not t e sor 
most non St' . ., d rn 
psych I - OICS Imagine. As far as I can tell, nothmg m mo e 
f th 0 o~ (or modern philosophy for that matter) undercuts this aspect o e tradition I' ' 
a StOIC account of emotion. 
Emotion as Natural 
What good ar h h 
. e uman emotions? The answers one can get to t at ques-
tIOn are frust . h' 
. ratlllgly circular. Ultimately, they amount to not mg more 
than thiS' hu . d r h 
.' man emotions, when they are good at all, are goo lor u-
mans Simply b h 
ecause humans are emotional creatures - creatures w 0 
are so const't d '. . ts f . I ute that they cannot stay healthy Without certam sor 0 
emotIOnal e . . d . I 
. xpenence, or flourish without a rich and vane emotIona 
bfe, ~r deliberate effectively about ends without giving those ends an 
emotional valence, or communicate adequately with each other without 
sympa~y and emotional gestures, or form profound attachments to each 
other Without empathy. But nothing in such answers suggests a transcen-
dent value for emotions as such _ something that would, for example, 
~ause us to think that nonhuman beings would necessarily be deficient 
Ifthe.y lacked emotion; something that would underwrite the temptation 
to thlOk that if any unfortunate, emotionless creatures were intelligent 
enough to appreciate the difference between human lives and their own, 
they would be like the wistful androids of science fiction, superhuman in 
some respects but yearning to find love and laughter. 
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it is true, of course, that humans are not the only creatures who 
NOwf'C ct Many other forms of life on this planet, from reptiles to the 
h ve a Ie . 
a s have neurological structures that are homologous to some 
eat ape, 
gr s we have in subcortical areas of our brains - structures that are 
tructure 
s to generate, in humans, raw primal affect such as fear, rage, sep-
kno~ anxiety, and desire (where that includes everything from pure 
ara~:ity to ferociously single-minded purposive behavior). 20 Moreover, 
cun
k 
w that these subcortical structures operate initially, precognitively, 
we no 
. uch the same way across all these species, and thus operate in hu-
m m infants and very young children in much the same way as they do in 
mane other species. But it is also clear that in adult human beings the fir-
som .. b . . 
. of these primal, emotlOn-generaung su cortIcal structures also lIghts 
Ing h . r·· . d . the neocortex - t e mlormatlOn-processmg apparatus aSSOCIate With 
up d If d h h· . . .. d . nition an se -awareness - an t at t IS cogmUve acuVlty ramaU-
cog . I . I h . cally reshapes our pnma emoUona responses. Adult urn an emoUon is, 
as the ancient Stoics insisted, inescapably cognitive in ways that we cannot 
map onto the physiology of reptiles, the lower mammals, and even (in 
large part) those primates with whom we are most closely related physio-
logically. Their affective experience, whatever it is li~e, is apparently not 
much like adult human emotion. Consequently, the good of adult human 
emotion, whatever it is, is inescapably tied to human nature - to what 
constitutes (adult) human health, human flourishing, human delibera-
tion, human communication, human relationships. And, of course, the 
obverse is true as well: the evils of human emotion lie in what constitutes 
ill health, failure to flourish, inability to deliberate effectively, inability to 
communicate fully, inability to form profound human relationships. This 
is circular, but instructive. 
Emotion and Health 
Consider health. 21 We are told, by the human sciences, that human in-
fants literally wither - fail to thrive physically; fail to develop a healthy 
physiology - if their primal emotions ("seeking," fear, anxiety, desire, 
rage) are not appropriately responded to, where appropriate response 
means enabling their purposive activity, alleviating their fear and anxi-
ety, satisfying or diverting their desire and rage, and in general holding, 
comforting, and caressing them. We are told that very young children de-
velop pathological psychologies if they do not form healthy attachments 
to those humans nearest to them, where a healthy attachment means one 
characterized in part by reciprocal emotional interaction that creates a 
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sense of security and possibility and enables learning and purposive ac-
tivity. We are told that the way these early stages of our emotional lives go 
has a profound effect on our basic temperaments (whether anxious, dis-
trustful, and pessimistic, for example, or secure, trustful, and optimistic), 
on the templates for human relationships we try to re-create and pre-
serve throughout our whole lives (or perhaps cannot help but re-create 
and preserve, despite our best efforts to avoid them), and on the nar-
rative expectations we have for the way our various endeavors will go 
(whether we think they will go well, for example, through our own ef-
forts or only through magic; whether we think we deserve for them to 
go well only if we are beautiful, or please others, or have won success 
through struggle). We are told that these basic temperaments, templates, 
and expectations have "default" epistemic consequences- that they shape 
what we immediately perceive, and consequently what we initially believe 
about the world, in ways that are resistant to rational reassessment. We 
are told that these epistemic defaults, because they influence cognition 
generally,22 influence the cognitive elements of mature human emotions 
as well, setting up the conditions under which we will continue to strive, 
or to give up; the conditions under which we will love or hate; the people 
with whom we will form profound relationships; and the general nature 
of those relationships, including how open, secure, and wholehearted, 
for example, or guarded, anxious, and tentative. All of this has conse-
quences for our health, both physical and psychological, throughout 
our lives. 
Emotion and a Good Life 
Now consider eudaimonia- not just a healthy life but an abundantly good 
one, a flourishing life. Again we get circular argument~, but instructive 
ones. We say life without emotion (to the extent that is even possible, psy-
chologically) would be unbearably bleak, dull, flat, boring, unmotivating, 
inert, depressing, joyless. But that is, of course,just another way of saying 
that emotion is good for emotional health; good emotion is emotionally 
good. And if circular arguments with a radius that short were generally 
available, philosophy would be remarkably easy. 
Notice, though, what the circularity of this argument suggests: it sug-
gests that adult human beings are so constituted that emotion is a neces-
sary or basic good for us - something we must have in order to flourish 
in any form accessible to us, or at least to our imaginations, and hence to 
our choices as rational agents. If so, then if we want to flourish at all, we 
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must follow our natures in this respect and get the affect we need. (Homo 
sapiens to be sure, but also homo ludens.) 
There are similar things to be said about communication, and social 
and personal relationships among humans. Many people say (or, at least 
since the rise of romanticism, have obsessively said) that we cannot fully 
connect with other people without being able to read and respond to 
their emotional frame of mind - the feeling, or lack of it, that informs 
their actions, their choices, their dealings with us. We describe people 
whom we cannot read in this way as remote, or inaccessible; sometimes 
as arrogant, rude, or lacking in the emotional generosity needed to allow 
us to respond fully to them. We say that profound personal relationships 
are necessary to the best forms of life, are a constituent of the most 
complete forms of human happiness, and that such relationships require 
that people be emotionally accessible to each other. The fact that this sort 
of talk is a peculiarly modern obsession, though of course not unknown 
in antiquity, should not lessen our confidence in its truth. But again 
we should be aware of a sort of circle in the implicit argument. The 
truth is that we need emotion only to connect with, communicate with, 
form profound relationships with emotional beings like ourselves. Being 
emotionally generous with a sponge is pointless as far as we can tell. 
Andjust as we sense, intuitively, in love relationships that the degree and 
timing of emotional honesty and intimacy are delicate matters, so too 
we sense that what counts as appropriate behavior in this regard varies 
widely from one person to the next, and one situation to the next with 
the same person. Some people are psychologically damaged in ways that 
make emotional honesty or openness in others threatening - an obstacle 
to their regaining their health rather than a necessity for it. 
Deliberation about Ends 
There is a line of thought about the necessity of emotion in human life 
that goes roughly like this: means-end reasoning may be purely hypo-
thetical or theoretical, aiming only at knowledge of causal relationships 
between an action and a goal in cases where neither is valued positively, 
or even thought to be permissible. That is to say, means-end reasoning 
may take this form: if one were to go for X, what would be the necessary 
(sufficient, the most efficient, best overall) means to take to get to that 
end? To turn such theoretical reasoning into genuinely practical reason-
ing, into deliberation, one must actually have an end, a goal, a purpose. 
Having a goal X is necessarily to value or prize X in a way that motivates 
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one to go for X, and valuing or prizing something in that motivating way 
necessarily has an affective dimension - one that we typically sum up in 
the term desire. One may feel such desire as either a push from within (an 
impulse) or a pull from without (an attraction). But in either case one 
does feel this. 23 This is not to say that having an end is thoroughly or even 
dominantly a noncognitive business. It is merely to say that having an end 
is always partly a noncognitive business. It is to say that insofar as we lack 
desire with respect to X, insofar as we feel no impulse or attraction to it 
at all, X cannot be one of our ends. Thus, people who lack desire entirely 
(if that is psychologically possible) lack ends entirely and are entirely un-
able to deliberate - entirely unable to engage in practical reasoning that 
leads to decision, as opposed to mere theoretical reasoning about means 
to hypothetical ends. 
In the hands of philosophers and philosophically inclined literary folk, 
this line of thought often appears to proceed in a priori terms, but this is 
clearly a mistake. One may, after all, have a motivating categorical com-
mitment to some end - a commitment that operates without intermediate 
desire. The refugee knocks on the door and we find ourselves with the 
immediate, categorical thought that we must help in some way, whether 
we want to or not. In fact, such motivating commitment to an end often 
operates despite our desire for conflicting ends. So it cannot be the case 
that there is a purely conceptual connection between having an end and 
having a desire for it. 
There is, however, some empirical evidence ofa psychological connec-
tion that underwrites this line of thought about deliberation. People who 
are brain-damaged (or medicated) in ways that appear to dramatically re-
duce or perhaps even eliminate a broad range of motivating desires have 
great difficulty in making decisions - in deliberating. But notice now that 
this gives us only another tight circle of argument about the good of 
human emotion: human desire is good for human deliberation because 
human deliberation (as a matter of human psychology) requires human 
desire. So what moral shall we draw from this? Follow nature? A very Stoic 
moral, and none the worse for that. 
VIRTUE AND TRANQUILLITY 
The question we must now consider is whether the Stoic commitment 
to virtue demands a psychology that diverges significantly - especially 
with respect to emotion - from one that is recognizably healthy by the 
standards of modern psychology. As we have seen, it is relatively easy to 
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make the case that there is a close connection between psychological 
health and the development of ordinary forms of rational agency along 
Stoic lines. The question that remains is about the sage, and about the 
fact that Stoicism requires one to strive to become a sage. 
The question is this: is training someone to be a sage rather like train-
ing someone to become a very specialized athlete, whose specialized 
physique is, in the long run, quite unhealthy? (Think of a Sumo wrestler.) 
Our agency powers are one element of our human endowments. What is 
the cost to the rest of our human constitution of maximizing the devel-
opment of agency? In particular, for present purposes, what is the cost to 
our emotions and feelings and to affect generally? 
The abilities of the Stoic sage are extraordinary- at the apex of human 
agency. And it is not easy to describe in a positive way what those abili-
ties would be like. The ancients were clear that while sages would have 
limited knowledge and power, by virtue of being finite creatures, and 
would therefore often fail in their endeavors (sometimes lethally fail), 
they would not be negligent in gathering and interpreting what infor-
mation was accessible to them, and they would not make mistakes - in 
the sense of misinterpreting or misapplying their knowledge in humanly 
avoidable ways. Moreover, sages would be able to cope with all sorts of 
adversity, difficulty, suffering, and disappointment, to the utter limit of 
human endurance. That kind of perfection would require sages always to 
be free from psychological disturbances that would interfere with their 
optimal exercise of agency, and it would require that their optimal ex-
ercise of agency never be disturbed by their own failures (because these 
would not be due to avoidable errors) or by any other events beyond their 
control, such as the death of a loved one, enslavement, or losses of any 
kind. 
What kind of psychology would such a sage have? Here it is easy to 
make a serious error, and answer that, in general, sages must have virtuosic 
abilities to cope with whatever befalls them. This is of course true, but only 
half the truth, and operating with that half-truth produces the following 
familiar but false picture of the sage: 
Sages are poised - perfectly poised - to understand their circumstances and op-
tions and to move in whatever way reason dictates. They must be calm, alert, and 
not committed in advance to a particular course of action that would prevent 
them from responding adequately to unanticipated events. Attachments to exter-
nals - to people, relationships, wealth, health, anything not wholly within one's 
control- threaten to compromise their coping ability by restricting their options 
in advance, and must be modified accordingly. Passions and strong emotions 
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compromise coping ability as well because they generate momentum like run-
ning full tilt downhill - and render us incapable of certain responses we might 
need to make (like stopping before we get to the clift). So passions and strong 
emotions must go. Similarly for any feelings and moods of a sort that disturb ei-
ther perception, deliberation, or choice. What this leaves for the sage is a form of 
tranquillity and detachment consistent with maximal alertness and readiness to 
respond to anything that happens. It is as if we imagined the sage as a world-class 
tennis player ready to receive serve - up on her toes, parallel to the baseline, 
perfectly balanced for an instant move either to the right or the left, perfectly 
positioned for a lunge, or a run, or a reflexive block of a shot hit directly at her 
body, racquet loose in the hand, uncommitted as yet to a forehand or backhand 
grip, eyes on the ball, but senses registering everything that is salient to making 
an effective return of serve, and focused, calm, tranquil, detached in the sense 
that she is not distracted by the crowd, her husband's infidelities, the injustice 
of her pending prosecution for tax evasion, the recent death of her first child. 
And, of course, we then imagine that this sort of tranquillity and detachment is 
the sage's permanent (waking) psychological condition. 
What is wrong with this picture is that it is constructed in terms of waiting 
for things to happen - in terms of being ready to receive serve. But the 
exercise of our agency is not just passive and reactive; it is also active, 
intentional, inventive, provocative, determinative. We have to step up 
and serve the ball and actually commit ourselves to making a particular 
sort of return, as often as we wait to serve, or wait to receive serve. And 
the picture of the sage in action is rather different than the picture of 
the sage in waiting. 
For one thing, inertia - getting going - is as big a problem for action 
as getting stopped. So is commitment, and momentum. If you have to 
jump from one rim of the narrow gorge to the other, you don't do it by 
keeping your options open permanently. You need speed, and running 
downhill (if you are lucky enough to have a hill nearby) isa good way to get 
going and keep going, even if it means you reach the point of no return 
sooner than you would if you tried to jump from a standing start. Focused, 
energized, muscular affect (tonos) 24 of the sort American professional 
football players work up before each game, and within the game before 
each play, is not typically out of place either, because the momentum it 
generates contributes to playing the game undercontrolat the highest level. 
It is, of course, possible to have an inappropriate type or amount of such 
affect, as inexperienced players often do. And some players find it hard 
to confine such energy to the game - to leave it on the field, as the saying 
goes - or to work it up without repeating a litany of false propositions that 
no Stoic could support. But no football coach thinks that such excesses 
Lawrence C. Becker 
give him a reason to discourage players from "putting on a game face" 
because it is understood that this is something that belongs only to the 
game, and only when it is consistent with playing under control. The point 
is simply that once we are committed to acting in a particular way, Such 
focused, energized affect and momentum are sometimes appropriate. 
And agents must always, ultimately, commit themselves to action. 
So we must not be misled by the ancient analogy between passion and 
running full tilt. This cannot mean that extreme, energized affect and 
momentum are always inappropriate. Mter all, the ancient Stoics were 
certainly aware of the way in which sleep, especially deep sleep, could 
compromise rational agency precisely because it creates the opposite sort 
of difficulty to running. In the running case, it is hard for agents to get 
stopped; in the sleeping case it is hard for them to get started. I am not 
aware of any ancient Stoic arguments to the effect that because of the 
difficulty of getting started, sages should not sleep, or not sleep deeply. 
And I am unimpressed by the comparable argument that because of the 
difficulty of getting stopped, sages should not run. This makes no sense 
in terms of the sage's final end - the perfection of the exercise of rational 
agency. When running is appropriate, sages run. When momentum is 
appropriate, sages have it. 
Notice, however, that this is not an Aristotelian point about the use-
fulness of passion (e.g., of anger) in motivating our actions, or even in 
sustaining the motivation. The ancient Stoics were right to insist that for 
the sage, the knowledge that a course of action is the appropriate one 
is always sufficient motivation to pursue it. The point here about mo-
mentum is rather a point about agent energy - about the physical and 
psychological resources an agent has to have to pursue an endeavor that is 
already motivated and already chosen. Sages who find themselves in close 
combat may find that they need ferocious energy, affect, and momentum 
as much as they need good blood gases - for fighting under control, to 
the limit of their abilities. And once we see that the intensity of the affect 
can be uncoupled from beliefs (recall that beliefs can be held with flat 
affect; ferociously intense affect can be generated precognitively, in the 
limbic system), we need not imagine that there is a necessary connection 
between achieving or sustaining such ferocity and holding false beliefs. 
It is certainly true that Stoics will reject any passions, or other intense 
emotional states that involve false beliefs, and it may be true that passions 
and strong emotions are usually dependent on false beliefs in some way. 
But such dependence is neither a logical nor a psychological necessity. 
Because Stoics are committed to the perfection of the activity of rational 
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agency, they are committed to cultivating the affective states needed for 
it. In the case of ferociously intense affective states, Stoics will reject those 
that invoke false beliefs and find other ways to cultivate intensity when it 
is needed. 
The general point is that in any environment rich with possibilities, 
the sage's exercise of rational agency will be exceedingly complex and 
call for a comparably complex affective life. There will be extended peri-
ods of careful deliberation and reflex reactions; mundane routines and 
high-stakes risk taking; strength moves; moves requiring little strength 
but major amounts of fine muscle control; coping with success; coping 
with unexpected good fortune; coping with failure; inventing remedies 
for boredom; inventing remedies for the stress of overwork; solving con-
flict, coordination, and cooperation problems with benevolent people; 
with malevolent people; being a friend; being a competitor; being an 
adversary; being an enemy; making war; making peace; making love; on 
and on and on. And all repeated in a bewildering variety of situations 
calling for subtly and not so subtly different conduct. It seems highly 
implausible to hold that any single, well-defined affective state (such as 
tranquillity) could possibly be adequate for sages engaged in a reason-
ably wide range of endeavors in a reasonably rich set of circumstances. 
And no matter how limited the sages' circumstances and options might 
be at a given time, they must be prepared for an unexpected reversal -
they must be capable of handling great good fortune and an abundance 
of opportunities. 
Thus, whatever ground-down form of affect may be required of the 
slave of a drunken despot or the prisoner in a death camp, Stoic training 
must aim to produce a psychology that can also respond appropriately 
to safety, security, freedom, and affluence. Stoicism is for emperors as 
well as slaves, the rich and famous as well as the obscure, the strong and 
beautiful as well as the weak and ugly - in the full range of situations 
in which those people can find themselves. That much has never been 
in doubt. We simply add here that the appropriate affective dimension 
of such lives will be as varied as those people and their circumstances, 
and we think that, once this point is understood, concentrating on the 
perfection of agency will not move us away from psychological health. 
LOVE, DETACHMENT, AND PURITY OF HEART 
That leaves love. There are two problems with it. One concerns the sort of 
quick release mechanism recommended by Epictetus in some notorious 
--- ---~------------------- -----
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passages about replacing lost wives and children, just as one replaces 
broken tea cups. Apparently the sage is supposed to be able to let go of 
externals so quickly that grief or suffering from a loss is not an issue. That 
persuades many people that there must be something phony about the 
way a sage loves in the first place. They suspect that the only way to achieve 
this sort of immediate release is to be more or less detached and unloving 
from the start. And, of course, Stoic insistence that virtue, rather than any 
external person or thing, is the only thing that is ultimately any good at all 
contributes to the impression that Stoics would resist becoming attached 
to externals - would resist, in that sense, a fundamental aspect of what 
we call love. 
The second problem with fitting a Stoic account of emotion into our or-
dinary notion oflove concerns the way in which Stoics must monitor their 
emotions intellectually, making sure that they do not involve any cognitive 
errors about what is ultimately valuable or about what affective responses 
are appropriate - that is, are psychologically healthy and otherwise con-
sistent with the development of virtue. The result of such monitoring is 
undeniably a persistent sort of highly refined triple consciousness: first-
order awareness within the emotional state itself, second-order awareness 
of being in the emotional state, and third-order awareness of the nature 
and value of being in that state. A Stoic is always going to be two parts 
observer and one part participant in emotional experience - something 
that will not only complicate the intentionality of Stoic loving but add a 
certain remoteness or distance to it as well. If purity of heart is to have 
simple intentions,25 then it looks as though it is going to be difficult for a 
Stoic to be pure-hearted in love - or wholehearted either, for that matter. 
Recall the line from an exasperated E. E. Cummings: "since feeling is 
first / who pays any attention / to the syntax of things / will never wholly 
kiss you."26 
Pure Love 
Let me address this purity of heart problem first. Double consciousness-
that is, awareness and awareness of being aware - is a necessary part of the 
kind of rational agency that develops in human beings as they mature. It 
is in that sense part of our nature as human beings. We can, of course, 
choose to regard it as a curse rather than a blessing and take steps to 
eliminate the self-consciousness part, leaving only first-order awareness. 
(I assume that people who valorize emotion would not want to go far-
ther and eliminate first-order awareness.) But once we acquire language, 
I 
I 
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self-consciousness is exceedingly difficult to strip away from first-order 
consciousness for more than short intervals, and it can be exceedingly 
dangerous to our health to do so in unfavorable circumstances. That 
suggests the importance of third-order assessments that address, among 
other things, when it is appropriate to lose ourselves in our experience 
and when it is not. ("Kiss me you fool." - Not now. The attic is on fire.) 
And the endorsement of the importance of those assessments is not any-
thing unique to Stoicism. It is a matter of common sense, not to mention 
sound psychotherapy. 
In the discussion of tranquillity I suggested that it was consistent with 
the notion of Stoic sagehood to recognize that the demands of virtuosic 
activity (as opposed to receptivity) sometimes include temporary, ratio-
nally controlled loss of self-consciousness. It seems reasonable to extend 
that point here to include the observation that third-order monitoring 
of one's emotions will thus sometimes be intermittent, controlled by so-
phisticated dispositions sensitive to changes in circumstance. A tennis 
player who is playing "in the zone," as they say, presumably still has a dis-
positional readiness to respond to things that are dramatically out of the 
ordinary (such as an earthquake or an attack by a spectator), as well as the 
dispositional readiness to come out of the zone when the match is over. 
In this respect there is little difference between Stoics and non-Stoics. 
Where there is a striking difference on these matters between Stoics 
and at least some non-Stoics (call them romantics) is in how willingly 
they embrace the complexity of intention in actively monitored emo-
tional states and the distancing it involves. 27 Stoics characteristically have 
no regrets about this at all, when it is the appropriate thing to do, and are 
unlikely to go out of their way to minimize the occasions when it is pru-
dent to monitor their emotions. Romantics seem dismayed and regretful 
about the necessity of such monitoring and are likely to make persistent 
efforts to avoid it. The argument between them, however, is ~ot.proper~y 
construed as one about the availability of wholehearted StOIC kisses. It IS 
rather about the value of emotion itself for the good life. 
Detachment 
Now to the question about detachment. The first thing to point out is 
that Stoics recognize what amounts to a very intimate and deep form 
of attachment as a fundamental mechanism in human psychology, and 
an indispensable mechanism for the development of virtue. I refer to 
the ancient discussions of oikeiosis - the appropriation or incorporation 
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f externals so that one's interest in their welfare ceases to be merely 
~ ..... ental and becomes instead like one's interest in one's own welfare. 
Instruv• . . 
That is surely the begmnmg of love: when one cares about another for 
the other's sake, not one's own. And when this occurs by way of oikeiosis-
b way of the psychological incorporation of the beloved's interests into 
y e'S own - the attachment is as strong and intimate as can be imagined. 
on 1· 11" "f th The ones we love are Itera y parts 0 us en, as romantics say. Such 
h ..... ents occur in the normal course of human events, whether we attaC LV 
ke further steps toward becoming Stoics or not. 
ta What is distinctive about Stoic love is how Stoics define human welfare, 
and consequently what our deepest cares and concerns are, both for 
ourselves and for those we love (for those who have become a part of us, 
s chologically). Stoics care ultimately only about virtue: excellence in 
~h~ activity of rational agency. But as I have argued, that entails caring 
about health - both about physical health and psychological health, inclu-
ding the range and depth of emotional experience necessary for it. It 
also entails caring about life itself, and liberty, and having the material 
resources necessary for the exercise of our agency. But we care about 
those things in a subsidiary way. It would be self-defeating to be concerned 
about them a way that forces us to compromise virtue. Thus death, disease, 
discomfort, or even slavery is preferable to a vicious life. Because those 
we love are a part of us, we love their lives, health, ease, and liberty the 
way we love our own - as preferable to their opposites, certainly, but as 
nothing compared to virtue. 
That means that a sage will not love others in a way that diminishes her 
virtue - her excellence in the exercise of her rational agency. She will not, 
for example, become so attached to others that she literally cannot bear 
the prospect oflosing them, any more than she would be attached to her 
own life in a way that made the prospect of her own death unbearable. 
Nor would she wish others to love her in that way - to be desolate and 
helpless when she is gone, unable to bear the loss. What Stoics wish for 
others is what we wish for ourselves: good lives; virtuous lives; including 
the ability to cope with loss. And we add this thought: when a loved one 
dies, it is literally not possible thereafter to care about his interests for his 
own sake, because he no longer exists. We must therefore think carefully 
about the cognitive content of the sorts of attachments and emotions 
that survive in us after his death. Whatever they are, however appropriate 
they may be as an extension of the concerns he had during his life, they 
cannot be the kind of love they once were: caring for another as we care 
for ourselves. When we pay attention to that, the alienating brutality of 
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some of the ancient texts on the subject of grief, love, and loss will be 
lessened. 
Is Stoic love austere? Not especially. To see this, I think it is only neces-
sary to reflect in a commonsense way on this thought: imagine a person 
who wants you to be able to say, truthfully, these sentences: "You are my 
love, my life, my whole life. If I were to lose you my life would be ruined; 
over." Those sentences are not about loving you for your own sake; they 
are not ultimately about you at all. They are rather the declaration of 
a medical emergency and a plea for help (or a threat). So what can it 
mean when people say that they want you to have that kind of emotional 
attachment to them? That they want you to lose your life when you lose 
them? Is that compatible with loving you for your own sake? If so, then it 
is that sort of love that is austere, not the Stoic sort. The only austerity 
in Stoic love comes not from its lack of attachment (there is plenty of 
attachment) but rather from its readiness to sacrifice everything except 
virtue for love. 
Notes 
1. In a famous passage in Lives of Eminent Phiwsophers (7.116), quoted here from 
LS 65F, Diogenes Laertius says: 
(I) They [the Stoics) say that there are three good feelings: joy, watchfulness, wish-
ing. (2) Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling 
[elation); and watchfulness is the opposite off ear, consisting in well-reasoned shrink-
ing. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will be watchful. (3) They say 
that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in well-reasoned stretching [desire). 
(4) Just as certain passions fall under the primary ones, so too with the ptimary good 
feelings. Under wishing: kindness, generosity, wamlth, affection. Under wdtchfulness: 
respect, cleanliness. Under joy: delight, sociability, cheerfulness. 
2. See, for instance, Stockdale 1993. 
3· Galen 1981 : 2.5. 
4· Panksepp 1998. 
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